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Abstract 
As the power load is less on holidays compared with 
the annual electricity load, we built a model to analyze 
the feasibility of the use of electricity for enterprises 
on holidays. This paper paid attention to the electric 
deployment under the government involvement. We set 
up a discounted electricity price, the industrial enterprises 
may restart production of the preferential tariff during 
holidays. It analyzed all of the situations that the power 
enterprises would like to do with the change of the public 
subsidies and encouragement of the government. It is 
helpful to deploy electricity and provide a reference for 
government to make a decision.
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 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, along with the rapid development 
of China’s economy and society, people’s living 
standards continue to improve, accordingly, the demand 
for recreation and entertainment is growing. Under 
the guidance of the economic policy “encourage 
consumption, stimulating domestic demand”, the holiday 
system is gradually improving, so that the residents 
have plenty of time to waste away on recreation and 
entertainment, holiday consumption, which promotes 
holiday economy to emerge. As the most important basic 
energy industry in the national economic development, 
the electric power is in close relationship to the social 
and economic development and residents’ daily life. 
The development of holiday economy is bound to 
have a greater impact on the electric power supply and 
demand, so that the holiday electricity shows some 
peculiarities. Among all of the holidays, the Spring 
Festival and the National Day which are the longest and 
the greatest impact holidays, their effect on the electric 
power supply and demand is particularly significant. 
As shown in Figure 1, the annual grid load was in the 
period of valleys in February and October, at which time 
the Spring Festival (February) and the National Day 
(October) is, that reflects some impact of holidays on 
electric power.
Figure 1
2010-2012 Annual Load Flow of One Province in 
China
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Actual ly,  according to  the exis t ing research 
achievements, we can get the main effects of holidays 
on power demand and supply are: a) The total electricity 
load level drops during the holidays. b) The total power 
consumption during declines the holiday. c) The daily 
load curve shape during the holiday is markedly different 
from normal days, which highlights the difference of 
the load curve peaks’ value and valleys’ value, and the 
different time period when they happen. The reasons 
mainly include the following factors: a) During the 
holidays, some industrial enterprises  stop production, 
the industrial and office electrical demand decline; b) 
The flow and distribution of personnel during the golden 
leisure and tourism holiday result in the rise of residential 
and commercial electrical demand.
In the article “The Analysis of Electricity Deployment 
if the Enterprise is working in Holidays”, we have 
discussed about that the power supply enterprises can 
set up a discounted electricity price during the holidays 
to encourage some industrial enterprises to restart 
production. Through the economic lever, the power 
grid can achieve the benefit of valley-filling and peak-
shifting. From that paper, we can get the conclusion 
that the more discounted electricity price which power 
supply enterprises give, there is the more possibility of a 
industrial enterprise restarting production during holidays 
and the more number of industrial enterprises would like 
to restart production, so that the power grid can achieve 
more valley-filling.
However, there are some problems remaining to be 
resolved: a) Giving a discounted electricity price means 
the power supply enterprises have to surrender part of the 
profits to the industrial enterprises. Although the power 
supply enterprises can profit from the valley-filling, they 
may still lack enough motivation to do this measure, 
especially when some power supply enterprises take this 
way while the others not, the total effect will be weak. b) 
The capacity of the power supply enterprises is limited. If 
the discounted electricity price set too low, there may be 
few industrial enterprises would like to restart production 
during holidays. Oppositely, if the discounted electricity 
price set too high, there would be little power supply 
enterprises take this measure as they can’t get benefit 
from it.
So, in this paper, we will talk about how to solve 
the conflicts. Naturally, we would like to look into our 
government, who has enough ability to take this measure 
and can also achieve benefit from the grid of valley-filling 
and peak-shifting. So, we will study how the electricity 
can deploy under the government involvement and what 
role the government can play in the holiday electricity.
1 .   G A M E  M O D E L  W I T H O U T 
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
Firstly, let’s begin from the discussion about the cost and 
benefit of the stakeholders involved in the measure of 
restarting production during holidays, including the power 
supply enterprises, the industrial enterprises and the staffs 
of the industrial enterprises, just as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
The Cost and Benefit of the Stakeholders Involved in the Measure of Restarting Production During Holidays
Stakeholders Cost Benefit
The power supply 
enterprises
The electricity income will reduce after carrying 
out the preferential tariff in the holidays.
Benefit from the valley-filling, including improving power grid 
load rate, improving the reliability of power supply, reducing 
the loss and saving energy, etc..
The industrial 
enterprises
Mainly the increase of labor costs, the cost of the 
enterprises arranging the production.
The drop of the electricity cost of the industrial production, the 
profits more production brings and the profits from the changes  
price of market after adjusting production.
The staffs of the 
industrial enterprises
Time cost of the holidays completely or partially 
expends, not enjoying holidays
The economic benefits of the multiple compensation, adjust time 
to rest.
As what mentioned before, giving a discounted 
electricity price means the power supply enterprises have 
to surrender part of the profits to the industrial enterprises. 
Although the power supply enterprises can profit from 
the valley-filling, they may still lack enough motivation 
to do this measure, especially when some power supply 
enterprises take this way while the others not, the total 
effect will be weak. We can divide all of the power supply 
enterprises into two categories: A who take the measure 
and B who don’t take the measure. Then, we can get the 
profit analysis as follows:
a) A and B both take the measure, so that the grid 
valley-filling is very effective and the average discounted 
electricity price that every power supply enterprise should 
set up is lower. We use T representing the benefit of every 
power supply enterprise.
b) A take the measure and B don’t take the measure, 
or the opposite. The grid valley-filling is weak. The ones 
who take the measure have to cost more to fill the grid 
load valley, so that their total benefit from the grid valley-
filling will be very low and even the negative. We use L 
representing the benefit of these power supply enterprises. 
On the other hand, the others who don’t take the measure 
will also benefit from the grid valley-filling without the 
cost of the discounted electricity price. So, they can get a 
higher benefit, using H to represent.
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c) Both A and B don’t take the measure. Then, both 
of them can’t get benefit from the grid valley-filling, 
meanwhile they also have no cost of the discounted 
electricity price. We use N representing the benefit of them.
Do not break general, we can get H>T>N>L. And 
without the government involvement, we can get the 
beneficial matrix of the power supply enterprises as 
shown in Table 2.
Table 2
The Beneficial Matrix of the Power Supply Enterprises
       B
   A
Take the 
measure
Don’t take the 
measure
Take the measure T, T L, H
Don’t take the measure H, L N, N
From the table, we can get the “Nash balance” is 
(N, N), which means all of the power supply enterprises 
will lack the motivation to take the measure of setting 
up a discounted electricity price during the holidays 
to encourage some industrial enterprises to restart 
production. That is bad for the power grid and the social 
welfare. So, we need the help of the government.
2.  GAME MODEL WITH GOVERNMENT 
INVOLVEMENT
To begin with, we will talk about why the government 
would like to involve in the measure. As the most 
important basic energy industry in the national economic 
development, the electric power is in close relationship 
to the social and economic development and residents’ 
daily life. Taking the measure to encourage the industrial 
enterprises to restart production during holidays can fill 
the grid load valley, so that improving power grid load 
rate, improving the reliability of power supply, reducing 
the loss and saving energy, producing evident economic, 
environmental and social benefits.
Secondly, we will discuss about what measures 
the government can take to involve in the restarting 
production during holidays, including positive measures 
and punitive measures. The positive measure is that the 
government can give public subsidies to the power supply 
enterprises taking the measure, so that the power supply 
enterprises have enough resources to set up a higher 
discounted electricity price to attract more industrial 
enterprises take part in and the load valley can fill more. 
The benefits are passed from the power supply enterprises 
into the industrial enterprises, and into the staffs of the 
industrial enterprises, all of them can benefit from this 
way. We use P representing the public subsidies that 
the government give. The punitive measure is that the 
government can set up an assessment index of the grid 
load trend, under which the power grid valley value is, 
the power supply enterprises will get the punishment, 
using F representing the fine. Then, we can get a new 
beneficial matrix of the power supply enterprises with the 
government involvement as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
The Beneficial Matrix of the Power Supply Enterprises 
Government Involvement
       B
  A
Take the 
measure
Don’t take the 
measure
Take the measure T+P, T+P L+P, H-F
Don’t take the measure H-F, L+P N-F, N-F
Assuming the ratio of the power supply enterprises 
taking the measure is x, the ratio not taking is y, then we 
can know x+y=1, according to the evolutionary game 
theory, we can get the fitness function of the power supply 
enterprises taking the measure is:
W1=x (T+P)+y (L+P)=xT+yL+P .
The fitness function of the power supply enterprises 
not taking the measure is:
W2=x (H-F)+y (N-F)=xH+yN-F .
The average fitness function is:
W
—
=xW1+yW2 ,
x3 =x (W1-W
—
)=xy(W1-W2)
     =x (1-x)[(T-H+N-L) x+L-N+P+F ,
y4=y (W2-W
—
)=xy (W2-W1)
     =y(1-y)[(T-H+N-i) y+H-T-P-F ,
As x+y=1, this paper will only analyze the x , 
combining the theories of power system, we can get the 
conclusions as follows:
Proposition 1 if P+F≥max{H-T, N-L}, the system (1) 
has two balance points: x1=0, x2=1, and x2=1 is the local 
gradual balance point of the system (1), x1=0 is not.
Proposition 2 if min{H-T,N-L}≤P+F≤max{H-T, N-L}, 
the system (1) have three balance points: x1=0, x2=1, 
x3=(L-N+P+F)(H-T+L-N)  . 
( a )  w h e n  H - T > N - L ,  i . e . ,  N - L < P + F < H - T , 
x3=(L-N+P+F)(H-T+L-N)  is the local gradual balance point of the 
system (1), x1=0 and x2=1 are not.
(b)when H-T<N-L, i.e., H-T<P+F<N-L, x1=0 and 
x2=1are the local gradual balance points of the system (1), 
x3=(L-N+P+F)(H-T+L-N)  is not.
Proposition 3 if P+F≤min{H-T, N-L}, the system (1) 
has two balance points: x1=0, x2=1, and x1=0 is the local 
gradual balance point of the system (1), x2=1 is not.
3.  THE ANALYSIS OF PARAMETER
In this part, we will analyze the parameter including T, L, 
H, N, P, F.
             P+F≥max{H-T, N-L} ,                                  (1)
where, P represents the positive effect of the government, 
and F represents the punitive effect. P, F play an 
important role in the choice of power supply enterprises 
to take the measure or not. If the public subsidies and 
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punishment of the government are high enough, i.e., P+F 
is higher enough than max{H-T, N-L}, we have T+P>H-F 
and L+P>N-F. According to the Table 3, we can get the 
conclusion that the power supply enterprises choosing 
to take the measure benefit more, so all of the supply 
enterprises will choose to take. As shown in Figure 2, two 
curves are given in which the initial value is 0.2 and 0.8, 
and the steady state of both of them is x=1.
Figure 2
P+F≥max{H-T, N-L}
      min{H-T, N-L}≤ P+F≤max{H-T, N-L} .            (2)
In this case, the number of H-T and N-L can make a 
difference to the evolutionary stable state.
(a) When N-L<P+F<H-T, we have N-F<L+P and 
T+P<H-F. According to the Table 3, we can get the 
conclusion that when the others choose to not take the 
measure, the power supply enterprises choosing to take 
the measure benefit more, oppositely, when the others 
choose to take the measure, the power supply enterprises 
choosing to not take the measure benefit more. When the 
system come to the evolutionary stable state, there will 
be x=(L-N+P+F)(H-T+L-N)  ratio of the power supply enterprises 
choose to take the measure. As shown in Figure 3, two 
curves are given in which the initial value is 0.2 and 0.8, 
if H-T=5, P+F=4, N-L=2, the evolutionary stable state 
is x=2/3, it means that there will be 66.7% of the power 
supply enterprises choose to take the measure, 33.3% not.
(b) When H-T<P+F<N-L, we have H-F<T+P and 
L+P<N-F. According to the Table 3, we can get the 
conclusion that when the others choose to not take the 
measure, the power supply enterprises choosing to not 
take the measure benefit more, oppositely, when the others 
choose to take the measure, the power supply enterprises 
choosing to take the measure benefit more. When the 
system come to the evolutionary stable state, there will be 
two possible results: all of the power supply enterprises 
choose to take the measure or all not. As shown in Figure 4, 
three curves are given of which the initial value is 0.2, 0.5 
and 0.8. When the initial value is 0.2, 0.5, the steady state 
is x=0. When the initial value is, the steady state is x=1. 
The evolutionary stable state is related to the initial value.
Figure 3
N-L<P+F<H-T
Figure 4
H-T<P+F<N-L
(c) P+F≤min{H-T,N-L} we have L+P< N-F and 
T+P<H-F. According to the Table 3, we can get the 
conclusion that the power supply enterprises choosing to 
not take the measure benefit more as the public subsidies 
and punishment of the government are not enough high. As 
shown in Figure 5, two curves are given of which the initial 
value is 0.2 and 0.8, the steady state both of them are x=0.
Figure 5
P+F≤min{H-T, N-L}
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied what choice the power 
enterprises would like to do under the government 
involvement.  The government can take posit ive 
measures and punitive measures to participate in the 
electricity deployment if the industrial enterprises restart 
production during the holidays. As shown in Table 4, 
it turned out that the steady state of the system will 
present the following situations with the change of the 
public subsidies and punishment of the government: 
a) When the public subsidies and punishment P+F is 
high enough so that all of the power supply enterprises 
will choose to take the measure. b) When the public 
subsidies and punishment P+F is less, the choice is 
related to the initial value. c) When the public subsidies 
and punishment P+F is too low so that all of the power 
supply enterprises choose to not take the measure. The 
conclusions have analyzed and explained all of the 
situations, which can be as a reference for decision 
making of the government.
Table 4
The Choice of the Power Enterprises With the Government Involvement
The change of the public 
subsidies and punishment of 
the government
The steady state The choice of the power enterprises
P+F≥max{H-T,N-L} x=1 all of the power supply enterprises choose to take the measure
N-L<P+F<H-T x=(L-N+P+F)(H-T+L-N)
x=(L-N+P+F)(H-T+L-N)  ratio of the power supply enterprises choose to take the 
measure
H-T<P+F<N-L x=0 or x=1, it is related to the initial value All of the power supply enterprises choose to take the measure or all not
P+F≤min{H-T,N-L} x=0 All of the power supply enterprises choose to not take the measure
Taking the measure to encourage the industrial 
enterprises to restart production during holidays can fill 
the grid load valley, so that improving power grid load 
rate, improving the reliability of power supply, reducing 
the loss and saving energy, producing evident economic, 
environmental and social benefits. Further study can pay 
close attention to the public subsidies and punishment 
of the government foe the industrial enterprises and the 
staffs, so that the electricity deployment can connect 
with the government, the power supply enterprises, the 
industrial enterprises and the staffs to maximize the social 
benefits.
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